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Case N'O. 7970

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SEP 2 8 1953

In the 1\'Iatter of the Estate of FLORENCE P. HOVVARD, also kno,vn as F. P.
HOWARD, Deceased,
K.A.TIONAL TRUST CO~IP ANY, LTD.,
as Administrator with the Will Annexed of
the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, Deceased, and COLIN_A_ FERRIE,
Petitioners in Intervention and
.A p·p-ellants,
-vs.-
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HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FOR-REST,
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PRO.;TESTANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COM~fiSSIONERS and McGILL UNIVERSITY, MILDRED BLACK, HILDA
BLACK, ROGER BLACK, R.ACHEL
HELPS and WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah Banking corporation,
Executor of the Estate- of Florence P.
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard,
Deceased,
Respondents.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
H. F. LAZIER of LAZIER & LAZIER,
JOHN- D. RICE, JAMES E. FAUST, J.
LAMBERT GIBSON, and CLEON B.
F;EIGHT,
.Attorneys for Petitioners in Intervention and .Appellants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEl\IENT OF F ACTS ______________________________________________________ l-7 inc.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ... ~----------------------------------------------'"-7 -8 inc.
ARGUMENT ----------------- ___________________ ----.---- ____________________________________ .__ .

8

POINT NO. 1. Tli.;.T TFIE POSTING OF NOTICES
IN THE ESTATE OF FLORENCE P. HOWARD, ALSO
KNOWN AS F. P. HOvV ARD, DECEASED, DID N·OT
COMPLY WITH TIIE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREFORE, THE
ENTIRE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS ARE A NULLITY __

8

A. THE POSTII~GS WERE NOT IN THREE PUBLIC PLACES, AS DEFINED BY STATUTE.
B. THE NOTICES, AS GIVEN, WERE NOT CALCULATED TO IM:P ART KNO\VLEDGE OF THE
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS TO THE HEIRS,
DEVISEES A:t~D LEGATEES.

C. NO NOTICE WAS :rdAILED TO THE HEIRS OR
TO APPELLA:t'-ITS.
POINT NO. II. APPELLANTS' MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND THE COURT HAD NO DISCRETION IN THE MATTER__________________________________________________ 18
POINT NO. III. STATUTE OF LIMITATION HAD
NOT RUN ON INTERVENTION __________________________________________ 25
9

POINT NO. IV. APPELLANTS HAD REASONABLE
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IF PERMITTED TO INTERVENE ____________________________ 29
POINT NO. V. SINCE THE PROPOSED INTERVENORS WERE DENIED INTERVENTION, THE
COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT AS THOUGH THEY
HAD BEEN GRANTED A TRIAL AND WERE
PARTIES, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO BIND THEM BY SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE, AS
SIGNED IN THE PURPORTED WILL CONTEST. ___________ 44
CON CL U SI 0 N _____ --------..... --------------------------------- _.- --- ________ --------------- 4 7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued)
TABLE OF CASES CITED
Page

Barber vs. Anderson, 73 U. 357, 24 7 P. 136 .. -----------·------------------ 19
Barrett vs. Whitney, 36 U. 574, 106 P. 522, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.)
368 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------________ 12, 17
Bjors Estate (Calif.), 229 P. 2d 468 .... ---------------------------------------- 30
Bromley vs. Bromley (Ill.), 191 N .E. 268 .... -------------------------------- 28
Bryan's Estate, 1907 Prob. 125, 6 B.R.C. 25 ... ----------------------------- 30
Bunting's Estate, 30 U. 251, 84 P. 109 ........ ~--------------------·-···--10, 18
Butzow's Etate (Calif.), 68 P. 2d 374......·---------------------------------· 27
Cache LaPoudre Irrigating Co. vs. Holley, 43 Colo. 32, 95
p. 317 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
Clark's Estate (Calif.), 149 P. 2nd 465 .... ------------------------------------ 30
Dempsey v·s. Lavvson L.R., 2 Prob. Div. 98 .... ----------------------------34, 42
Drake's Estate, 15 N.J. Misc. R. 44, 192 A. 428 .... -------------------- 35
Fawcett's Estate 1941 Prob. 86 ............ ------------------------------------------ 30
Foy vs. Foy, 125 Iowa 424, 101 N.W. 144...... ------------------------------ 41
Gensimore's Estate, 246 Pa. 216, 92 A. 134 .... ---------------------------- 42
Goods of Hartley, 50 L.J .P .D. L ___________________________________________________ 41
Houston Real Estate Investment Co. vs. Hechler, 44 U. 64,
138 p. 115'9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
Iburg's E·state, 196 Colo. 333, 238 P. 74.... ------------------------------------ 42
Kearns vs. Roush (W. Va.), 126 S.E. 729 ...... ------------------------------ 41
Marx's Estate, 174 Calif. 762, 164 P. 640, 28 A.L.R. 2nd
546 .and 555 _________________________ -------------.... _____________________ ----------.------ 30
Maurier vs. Miller, 77 Kan. 92, 93 P. 596, 8 A.L.R. 2nd 111. ... 29
McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 160 A. 24 ...... ------------------------------ 40
Myreck vs. Kahle, 120 Wis. 57, 97 N.W. 506 ........ -------------------· 17
Parker vs. Ross (Utah), 217 P. 2d 373 ............ ------···---------------·--· 40
Peck's Estate, 153 Wash. 687, 280 P. 87 .... ------------------------------------ 27
Phillip's Estate, 86 U. 358, 44 P. 2d 699 ____________________________________ 14-15
Plenty vs. West, 6 C.B. 201, 16 Beg. 173, 51 Eng. Rep. 743,
9 J ur. 458 _____________________________________________________ -------------------------30, 42
Powell vs. Koehler, 52 Ohio 102, 39 N.E. 195, 26 L.R.A.
480, 49 Am. St. Rep. 705 ... ·-----------------------------····--·--·-·-·--·······-· 28
Roach vs. Eugene, 23 Ore. 376, 31 P. 825 ....... ·-·----------------------···· 17
Rogers vs. Trans American Corp. (Calif.), 44 P. 2d 635'-------· 46
Sampson vs. Foxon, 1907 Prob. 34·------·------------------·········--------·-·-· 41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CASES CITED-(Continued)
Page
Sandford vs. Vaughan, 1 Phil. Eccl. Rep. 39, 161 Eng. Reprint 907 --------- ____________ . ___ . -------------... __________________ .. ___________ . __ __ ______ 3 3
Shiel vs. O'Brien, Ir. Rep. 7 Eq. 64·----------------------------------------------Tidd vs. Smith, 3 N.H. 178, 2 A.L.R. 1013 ____________________________________
Tiller vs. Norton (Utah), 253 P. 2nd 618 ____________________________________
Venable's "\Vill, 127 N.C. 344, 37 S.E. 465 ____________________________________
Voyce vs. Superior Court (Gal if.), 127 P. 2d 536____________________
Weichold vs. Day (Okla.), 236 P. 649 __________________________________________

34
17
39
41
27
28

Wells vs. Kelley, 11 U. 421, 40 P. 705 .... -------------------------------------- 9
Weyant vs. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 54 U. 181, 182 P.
189, 9 A.L.R. 1119 .... ------------------------------~------------------------------- 17
"\Villiams vs. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N .W. 705 ____________________________ 41
Wupperman's Estate, 300 N.Y. Supp. 344, 28 A.L.R. 2nd 5-35 .. 30
STATUTES
Section 7 4-1-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ... ----------------------------- 39
Section 7 4-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953·---------~----------------------- 29
Section 75-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ________________________ 9, 16, 17
Section 75-4-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________________________ 16, 18
Section 75-14-14, Utah Code Annotated, 195'3 ________________________ 19, 28
Section 75-14-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ______________________________ 47
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure________________________________________ 19
TEXT BOOKS
2 Abbott's Probate Law, Sec. 853 .... ---------------------------------------------- 10
21 Am. J ur. 435 .... -----------------------------------------------------------------;---------- 17
30 Am. J ur. 951 _______________________________________________________________ ----------------- 45
31 Am. J ur. 7 4---------------------------------------------------------------------------------39 Am. J ur. 251. ... ---------------------------------------------------------·------------------57 Am. J ur. 7 57 __ --------------------------------------------._--------- ______ ----------_______
2 A.L.R. 1008 ____________________ --------------------------.----.--------- _--------- __ --------- __
28 A.L.R. 2nd 552, 554 .... -----------------------------------------------------------------1 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, 410 ________________________
2 Bancroft',s Code Practice & Remedies, 1139 ____________________________

45
17
30
17
30
26
21

46 Corpus Juris 560 .... ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
1 Freeman on Judgments 899 .... ------------------------------------------------------ 44
15· Iowa Law Review 232 .... -------------~----------------~------------------------------- 41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of FLOR- \
ENCE P. HOWARD, also known a.s F. P.
HOWARD, Deceased,
NATION.A.L TRUST COl\IP ANY, LTD.,
as Administrator "\Vith the Will Annexed of
the Estate of R-obert Bown Ferrie, Deceased, and COLINA FERRIE,
Petitioners in Intervention and
Appellants,
-vs.-

HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FORREST,
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PROTESTANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COM. MISSIONERS and McGILL UNIVERSITY, MILDRED BLACK, HILDA
BLACK, ROGER BLACK, _R.ACHEL
HELPS and WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah Banking corporation,
Executor of the Estate of Florence P.
Howard, also known as F:. P. Howard,
Deceased,
Respondents.

Case No. 7970

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
ST·ATEMENT OF· F AC.TS
Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard,
died in Montreal, Canada on the twenty-eighth day of
January, 1952.
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On the third day of .J._~pril, 1952, the Walker Bank &
Trust Company, a Utah banking corporation, filed a
Petition in the District Cou.rt of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of l"'"tah,
entitled, "Petition for Probate of Will and Application
for Commission to Take Testimony and Settle Interrogatories" (Record, page 5). Said Petition set forth
the names and residences of certain people designated
as the heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, so far
as then known to the Walker Bank & Trust Company
(Record, page 6, 7 and 8). Not one of the people on said
list was a resident of the State of Utah, and n1ost of then1
were residents of the Dominion of Canada. Your Appellants, herein, were not listed on said Petition in any
manner and are among the nearest heirs of the said
Florence P. Howard, also known as F·. P. Howard.
That on the first day of May, 1952, the Walker Bank
& Trust Company filed a "Supplemental Petition for Probate of Will" (Record, pages 26 to 30). Said Supplen1ental Petition allegedly set forth additional names and
residences of certain heirs, legatees and devisees (Record, page 26), although the name of no additional person was eontained in said Supplemental Petition .

.

No publication of the Petition or ·supplemental Petition for Probate of Will was n1ade in any paper, (Record
page 25), and the notices given were, mailing of notices,
but not to the Appellants, (Transcript, 294 to ~!)5 ), and
three postings: One of \vhich w·as at the West entrance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the City and County Building, in Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah (Transcript 274). The second notice "\Yas in the Federal Post Office on \ . ine Street
in ~Iurray, lTtah, inunediately East of State Street
(Transcript, 27-±). The third notice vvas on a bulletin
board located immediately East of State Street on 33rd
South Street in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Transcript, 27±). Said bulletin board is a wooden board, approximately three and one-half feet vvide and appToximately five and one-half feet long, standing on two
wooden supports, approxilnately t"\vo inches by four
inches in size (Transcript 275), and said board is not illuminated and is not designated as a public posting board,
nor has it any sign on it stating that it is a public posting
board (Transcript, 281). It is merely a flat board upon·
vlhich the notices are placed by means of thumb tacks or
tacks (Transcript 282), and said board is located between
the North sidewalk of 33rd South Street and the North
boundary of the vehicular travelled portion of 33rd South
Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, (Transcript,
275). The notices were placed on that part of the board
facing the vehicular travelled portion of said street, and
the rear of the board being to said sidewalk. Papers, so
posted, cannot be seen from the sidewalk to the North
of the board (Transcript, 276). Water and splashings
from the travel, of course, get upon said posted notices
(Transcript 275 and 282). Immediately to the rear of
said board and North of said sidewalk is a lot containing
trees and lawn and a building known as the South Salt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lake Stake Tabernacle is to the East and North of said
board. Said hoard is not enclosed in any building (Transcript, 271 to 287) .
On the fourteenth day of May, 1952, based upon such
posting, and without any notice having been mailed to
these Appellants (Transcript, 294), four holographic
instruments were admitted to pTohate as the last "\Vill and
Testament of said :B,lorence P. Howard, also known as
F. P. Howard, deceased (Record, page 33), and the
Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed Executor
of the Estate of said decedent (Record, page 35).
Subsequent to the admission of the instruments to
probate, the Walker Bank & Trust Con1pany, realizing
, that it had listed in its Petition, aln1ost entirely persons
listed as friends and knowing there were heirs whose
names had not been set forth on the Petition for Probate,
and having determined that decedent had relatives other
than those who were listed in the Petetion for Probate
of Will, petitioned the Court for an Order (Record, pages
53 to 55), which was granted (Record page 52), on the

third day of September, 1952, directing the Walker Bank
& Trust Company to notify the additionally discovered
heirs that said documents had been admitted to probate
as the last Will and Testament of decedent. That your
Appellant, National Trust Co1npany, Ltd. \vas not included in the list of names to whom notice 'vas given on
the said third day of Septernber, 1952, although in .August
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of 1952, the said \\Talker Bank & Trust Company had
written to the National Trust Company, Ltd. and Colina
Ferrie (Record, page 51).
On the twelfth day of N oven1ber, 1952, Helen Duys,
Ernest F. Howard and Ethel Forrest filed a Contest of
Order Admitting \'Vilis to Probate (Record, pag_e 131).
No notice of said Contest was served upon either of the
Appellants herein (Record, pages 129, 130, 135 and 136),
although Colina Ferrie was then an heir of record.
On or about the sixth day of December, 1952~ Hilda,
~iildred and Roger Black and Rachel Helps, filed an
Ans\Yer to said Contest (Record, page 62).
On the sixteenth day of December, 1952, the McGill
University and the Protestant Board of School Commissioners of Montreal, each filed Answers to said Contest
(Record, pages 64 and 66), and Walker Bank & Trust
Company also filed an Answer to said Contest (Record,
page 119)~
On the fifteenth day of November, 1952, the Walker
Bank & Trust Company filed a "Petition to Construe
Will" (Record, page 74). That the Petition to Construe
Will and the Contest of Will, were consolidated for hearIng.
On the fourteenth day of January, 19·53, Appellants
herein, filed a Motion to Intervene in the said Will Contest and asked permission to file the attached Answer and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Cross-Complaint in Intervention (Record, page 141).
On the same date, they filed their position and Answer
in the Petition to construe the Will (Record, page 162).
On the nineteenth day of January, 1953, the Motion
to Intervene was heard in said District Court and the
Honorable Judge thereof, denied Appellants' right to intervene in said Will Contest (Record, page 196).
After denying Appellants right to intervene in the
Will Contest, the Court heard arguments in relation to
the construction of the four holographic instruments
which had been admitted as a Will, and on February 10,
1953, Ordered, "That the four instruments in the Executor's Petition to Construe the Will are declared to be
the last Will and Testament of the deceased, Florence P.
Howard, and. that all four Wills are valid and constitute
the Will of said deceased and should be administered as a
whole, except insofar as they are irreconcilable as to particular bequests, and each should be given effect insofar
as possible." (Record 198). Thereafter, and after this
Intermediate Appeal was granted by your Honorable
Court, the Attorn~ys for Helen Duys, Ernest F. Howard
and Ethel F'Orrest prepared, and on March 22, 1953,
asked the Court to sign, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree in the Will Contest, wherein it
was stated that the Appellants herein were represented
in said action and ignored the Order, theretofore signed
by the Court, on February 5, 1953, denying leave to intervene, and said Findings, Conclusions and Decree purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ported to dismiss the Cross-Co1nplaint in Intervention,
although Appellants were not permitted by the Court to
file it or to support it by evidence or law, (Record, page
2±7 to 249).
STATEnlENT 013, POINTS
POINT NO. I.
THAT THE POSTING OF NOTICES IN THE ESTATE OF
FLORENCE P. HOWARD, ALSO KNOWN AS F. P. 'HOWARD,
DECEASED, DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
OR CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREFORE, THE ENTIRE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS ARE A
NULLITY.
A.

THE POSTINGS WERE NOT IN THREE PUBLIC
PLACES, AS DEFINED BY STATUTE.

B.

THE NOTICES, AS GIVEN, WERE NOT CALCULATED TO IMPART KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS TO THE HEIRS, DEVISEES
AND LEGATEES.

C.

NO NOTICE WAS MAILED TO THE HEIRS OR TO
APPELLANTS.

POINT NO. II.
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND
THE COURT HAD NO DISCRETION IN THE MATTER.

POINT NO. III.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION HAD NOT RUN ON INTERVENTION.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT NO. IV.
APPELLANTS HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IF PERMITTED TO
INTERVENE.

POINT NO. V.
SINCE THE PROPOSED INTERVENORS WERE DENIED INTERVENTION, THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
MADE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT AS
THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN GRANTED A TRIAL AND
VvERE PARTIES, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO BIND THEM BY SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF, LAW AND DECREE, AS SIGNED IN THE
PURPORTED WILL CONTEST.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THAT THE POSTING OF NOTICES IN THE ESTATE OF
FLORENCE P. HOWARD, ALSO KNOWN AS F. P. HOWARD,
DECEASED, DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
OR CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREFORE, THE ENTIRE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS ARE A
NULLITY.
A.

THE POSTINGS WERE NOT IN THREE PUBLIC
PLACES, AS DEFINED BY STATUTE.

B.

THE NOTICES, AS GIVEN, WERE NOT CALCULATED TO IMPART KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS TO THE HEIRS, DEVISEES
AND LEGATEES.

C.

NO NOTICE WAS MAILED TO THE HEIRS OR TO
APPELLANTS.
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Proper notice of the Petition to admit 'vills to probate must be given to all heirs, devisees and legatees of
the decedent, or the proceedings of the Court are void.
In fVells v. J( elley, 11 U. -±21, 40 P. 705, the Court
stated:
"The law is too well settled to require references to authorities that where jurisdiction depends on the publication of a notice, and the trial
of the cause is proceeded with before such pub""'
lication is complete, the C-ourt acts without jurisdiction and its orders are void."
Section 75-3-5, lT tah Code Annotated, 1953, provides :
"Notice and Hearing-'When the Petition is
filed it must be set for hearing, notice of which
shall be given by publication or by posting as the
court or clerk may direct and by the 1nailing of
notices to the heirs, and to the executor, if he is
not the petitioner."
The Court may order either publication or posting,
but the mailing to the heirs is mandatory.
It will be noted that the Court limited the Clerk in
the mailing of notices to certain named persons (Record,
page 25), so that the Clerk could not and was not permitted to use independent judgment or to mail notices
to any heirs whom he might find. He wa;s limited to the
"heirs, legatees and devisees * * $ who are listed and
whose addresses are shown in the Schedule attached to
the Supplemental Petition for Probate of Will." Such
limitation upon the mailing of notices to the heirs is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contrary to the statute above quoted and is an abuse of
the court of its power, particularly when such notices
are jurisdictional. Neither the- Judge, nor the Clerk 1nay
1nake a valid order setting aside the jurisdictional requireinents in such a case.

In re Bunting's Estate, 30 U. 251, 84 P. 109, no
:notice was mailed to the heirs at law. The Supreme
Court held that the lower Court had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and set aside the probate proceedings. It
stated:
''The purpose of the law in requiring notice to
be given of the time and place of hearing petitions
for letters of administration is to advise those
\Vho are interested in the proceedings and give
them an opportunity to be present, and, if they so
desire, make objections to the issuance of letters
to the party petitioning therefor. * * *"
'~Therefore, because Guheen may not haYe
had actual, positive knowledge at the very n1on1ent
of filing his petition, of the place of residence of
the heirs, all of whon1 were minors at the tiine
Bunting died, and all, except one, at the time the
petition was filed, did not dispense with the necessity of mailing notices to them as required hy
Sec. 3818, R.evised Statutes, 1898, of the place and
time of the hearing on the petition at Blackfoot,
Idaho, the place where Bunting resided at the ti1ne
of his death, and which was known to Guheen
\Vhen he filed his petition."
The Court, in the above case, quoted with approval,
2 Abbott's Probate Lau}, Sec. 853, wherein it "Tas stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. "All jurisdiction of persons or property depends upon notice. It is the one fundamental and
indispensable foundation for 'due process of law',
and it Inay be said, as a rule without exception,
that no judicial action whatsoever, is valid or
binding 'vithout son1e notice, actual or constructive. It is likevvise funda1nental that the requirements for giving notice must be strictly -complied
with, and this rule applies with increased force to
'vhat are termed 'special proceedings'. Proceedings in probate belong to this class."
Most of the names set forth in the Petition and Supplemental Petition of Walker Bank & Trust Company,
for probate of the will, were listed as friends. Walker
Bank & Trust Co1npany, by its "Supplemental Petition
to Probate", at least implied to the Court that additional
heirs, legatees and devisees had been found, but the sai9Supplemental Petition contains the name of not a single
additional person. Later on, as shown by the Affidavit
of Walker Bank & Trust Company (Record, page 168169), the bank determined from Rosamond Lamb that
many additional persons were heirs of Florence P.
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased. This determination was apparently made well after the instruments had been admitted to probate and after the time
of the jurisdictional notices. It will be noted that Walker
Bank & Trust Company was well acquainted with Rosamond Lamb. Rosamond Lamb had picked up the old
wills from the bank and had taken Mrs. H·oward to Montreal with her. Mrs. Howard died while visiting with
Rosamond Lamb and in a hospital in Montreal where the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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said Rosamond Lamb lived. Rosamond Lamb had, after
the death of Mrs. Howard, filed a request to have a Five
Thousand Dollar ($5,000.00) check, issued by l\frs.
Howard prior to her death, honored and paid (Record,
page 44), and the said Rosamond Lamb was one of those
who the bank knew to be associated with the affairs of
Mrs. Ho,vard. This should have caused Walker Bank &
Trust Company to inquire of Miss Lamb, one of the very
close friends of Mrs. Howard, as to who were the heirs
of Mrs .. Howard. If the bank had so inquired, the nan1es
of the people listed in the Affidavit of the bank, 'vould
have been known to the bank prior to the Petition and
prior to the Supplemental Petition for Probate of \Viii,
and the jurisdictional requirements of 1nailing could have
been met.
In the case of Ba.rrett v. Whitney, 36 U. 574, 106 P.
522, cited with approval in the Bunting case, the Court
said:
"Section 4026 provides the time for which notice must be given, and this court, in a direct proceedings, (in re Bunting's Estate, 30 U. 251, SJ
P. 109), held that, unless the notice is given for
the time and in the manner provided in said Seetion, the court acquires no jurisdiction of the proceedings."
The case further implies that the court must be fully
advised of all the premises, including names of all heirs,
or if there may be unknown heirs, or heirs \vith unkno"rn
addresses, that fact 1nust be set forth. The court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The heirs Inay be ntunerous, and may live in
different parts of this, or even in so1ne other
Country. \Vhen their na1nes and places of residence are thus given, or 'vhen the fact is n1ade to
appear that they are tmkno-w~n, as i.t must be
(emphasis added) in the position for the letters of
administration, the probate court is fully advised
'vith respect to the true situation. While the court
may assun1e that, as a matter of lav{, and for the
purpose of jurisdiction, both the known and unknown heirs are before the court, yet, whether the
heirs are living in different states, or otherwise,
it cannot be presumed that a prudent and careful
Judge would ordinarily proceed to distribute,
without notice to the heirs, or to some a.ccredi ted ·
person representing them."

In the case at Bar, it is obvious that none of the
heirs were residents of the State of Utah. That most
of the heirs, devisees and legatees were residents of the
Dominion of Canada, and a "prudent and careful Judge
would ordinarily proceed" to have notices published in
the Dominion of Canada, or at some other place calculated to come to the attention of the unknown heirs of
Florence P. Howard, also known as F·. P. Howard, deceased, that a will was to be admitted to probate. Note,
that the publication of notice to creditors was had in the
South Salt Lake Herald (Record, page 35A and 38). Did
the Walker Bank & Trust Company have full realization
of its duty to give the kind of notice calculated to come to
the attention of the heirs or creditors of a person from
Canada, who was in Canada when she

died~
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In re Phillips' Estate, 86 U. 358, 44 P. 2d 699, the
court discussed the question of whether proper notice
was given to convey jurisdiction, and in so doing, stated:
"The law did not intend that a n1ere obeisance
should be done to the obligation of providing the
world with notice when jurisdiction itself depended upon such notice. The notice is highly substantive and not conventional; it is intended not only
to give notice to parties interested, but to raise
a notoriety which through the common concourse
of mankind .might reach persons interested. At a
time it was doubted by thoughtful members of the
bar whether posting would stand the test of due
process. The best that posting can do toward giving- notice is none too good. Certainly, concentrating the three postings in a limited area 'vhere
they simply duplicated the effect of one is insufficient. It does not give the notoriety which in the
end may reach interested parties. It does not 1neet
the requirements of the statute. Not an answer is
to say that in all probability persons in Boston
would. not have had communicated to them directly
or indirectly notice of the pending probate proceedings, even though the notices were posted
widely over the county."
In the case at Bar, nothing was done, "to raise notoriety, through which the common concourse of mankind
might reach persons interested." The Petitioner for
Letters Testamentary knew that Mrs. Florence P. Howard carne originally from Canada, was born and grew to
young womanhood in that Dominion, and that her frunily,
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side in Canada. I-Iowever, it did nothing, nor did it attempt to do anything, to cause any notoriety in the
Dominion of Canada, 'vhich n1ight co1ne to the attention
of any of the heirs of ~Irs. Florence P. Howard, also
known as F. P. Howard.
In re Phillips' Estate, the court further stated:
'~That

the mere negative finding that the posting in this case is not sufficient, is of little guide
to the persons whose duty it is to post notices.
Ori the other hand, an affirmative rule, of what is
sufficient, depends so much upon the situation in
every county, and perhaps the situation in the
cases themselves, that hard and fast rules cannot
be enunciated. * * * There should be customary
places at which all notices should be posted, which
places should be at conspicuously public points
and not on the by-ways. * * *"
"The proof of posting, contained in the probate files, reveals the posting to have been at the·
vVest entrance of the City and County Building,
on University Avenue, and on Center Street. We
cannot take judicial notice that these streets are
in Provo, or that they are actually within 80 yards
of each other. We are confined to the facts set
out in the petition to set aside for that information."
In the case at Bar, the testimony sho,vs that all notices were posted immediately adjacent to the East of
8tate Street, as it runs through Salt Lake County
(Transcript, 280). The notice posted in the Post Office
at Murray, was posted on Flederal property, and within
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the jurisdiction of the United States. The notice posted
on 33rd South Street was not such a notice as would give
notoriety to the pending action. The paper upon which
the notice was written, could not be seen by people walking along the sidewalk, and could be seen only by cars
driving West, or parked on the No-rth side of 33rd South
Street (Transcript, 276). The notice, itself, could not be
read from such cars, nor could it be read by people along
the sidewalk on 33rd South Street. The only possibility
for reading the same, would be on foot, between the
"bulletin board" and the vehicular travelled portion of
33rd South Street. The testimony further shows that the
"bulletin board" was situated in such a position that it
\vas a common occurrence for 1nuddy water to be splashed
thereon and to obliterate the notices posted thereon
(Transcript, 282.). As a practical matter, the only 'vay
such a notice would be seen, would be for a person to
make a special trip for that particular purpose and to
walk around behind the "bulletin board" and to read
therefrom.
We further desire to call the Court's attention to
the fact that no notice was mailed to the Appellants herein (Section 75-4-8, and Section 75-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953), on the Petition or Supplemental Petition
to Probate the Will, and the sole and only basi~ upon
which it might be claimed that notice was given to the1n
was the posting heretofore discussed, which does not n1eet
the require1nents of the constitutional provision of due
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process of la-\v, and is not that type of notice calculated
'~to raise a noto1:iety \vhich, through the con1n1on concourse of n1ankind reach persons interested."
The following citations, cover certain cases in which
the posting of notices have been held insufficient because
of the place where posted.

JJ!Iyreck v. Ka.hle, 120 Wis. 57, 97 NvV 506;
Ti.dd v. Smith, 3 N.H. 178, 2 ALR 1013;
Roach v. E~~gene, 23 Ore. 376, 31 P. 825.
See also the discussions in 2 ALR 1008, 39
Am. Jur., page 251 and 46 C.J. 560.
It \vill be noted that in the instant case, no notice of
the Petition, or Supplemental Petition to Probate the
Will was ever mailed to any of the Appellants.
21 Am. Ju.r., page 435, states:

"vVhere a requirement of notice is jurisdictional, unless the notice is given for the time
and in the manner provided, the court acquires no
jurisdiction of the probate."
Citing:
Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust Comp·any,
54 U. 181, 182 P. 189, 9 ALR 1119;

Barrett v. Whitney, 36 U. 574, 106 P. 522, 37
LRA (NS-) 368.

The Utah Statutes on the subject are as follows:
Section 75-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads:
"When the petition is filed, it must be set for
hearing, notice of which shall be given by publication or by posting as the court or clerk may direct,
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and by mailing of notices to the heirs, and to the
executor if he is not the petitioner." (Emphasis
added).
Section 75-4-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads:
"When a petition praying for letters of administration is filed, the court or clerk must set
the petition for hearing and give notice thereof
by publication, or by posting and by mailing notices to the heirs." (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, there 'vas no publication of notice and no 1nailing to the Appellants herein. The only
possible nQtice given to them was that given by the socalled posting.
In re Bunting's Estate, Supra, holds that the notice
provided for in the above Sections of the Statutes must
be mailed to the heirs.

POINT NO. II.
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND
THE COURT HAD NO DISCRETION IN THE MATTER.

The Appellants herein feel that the entire proceedings of the lower Court in the Estate of Florence P.
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased, are a
nullity. However, they desire to present the argu1nents
on the next four points to your Honorable Court, in the
event that your Honorable Body decides the first point
contrary to their position.
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Appellants' l\fotion to Interyene '""as not discretionary ""ith the Court, but the right is given by Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Utah cases. \.T olun1e 9, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, gives Rule 2-1- of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, "\Yhich states:
(a) Intervention as a Inatter of right. "Upon
timely application anyone shall be_ permitted
to intervene in an action: ( 1) when a statute
confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may
be inadequate and the applicant is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3)
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is the custody or
subject to the control or disposition of the
court or an officer thereof."
This Application for Intervention was filed prior
to the time the case \Vas called for trial and was heard
prior thereto. In the case of Barber v. Anderson, 73 U.
357, 274 P. 136, the Utah Supreme Court held, the person
who asked leave to intervene on the day of the trial had
made timely application for intervention and she was
permitted to intervene in such case.
Appellants were entitled to intervene under each
of the subheadings of the Rule. The first sub-heading
which states, they are permitted to intervene "when a
statute confers an unconditional right to intervene", is
covered by Section 75-14-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which Section states:
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"Any person shall have a right to be heard by
the court at any hearing on any question affecting
a probate or guardianship matter in which he is
interested."
In the case at Bar, the Appellants herein are vitally
interested in the Will Contest, and the Statute, above
quoted, gave them the right, unconditionally, to be heard
in the matter.
The second point under the Rule provides them unconditional right to intervene, "'vhen the representation
of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or 1nay
be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by
a judgment in the action".. There is no question in tl1e
instant case, but tha.t the representation of Appellants'
interest wa.s inadequate. This matter is conclusively
shown by the fact that all parties to the action, including
the Executor, Walker Bank & Trust Company, resisted
the intervention and resisted the right of Appellants to
be heard, and the Stipulation between some of the parties
(Recora, page 178 to 182), and the payment of the Clain1
of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) by the Executor to
Rosamond Lamb. No one who was in the case, represented Appellants' interest in any degree.
The third point, that "when the applicant is so situated a.s to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property \vhich is in the custody or subject
to the control or disposition of the court" has direct application in the instant case. Appellants are so1ne of the
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heirs at la'v of Florence P. Ho,vard, also known as F. P.
Howard, and they are so situated as to be adversely affected by the distribution of the estate of Florence P.
Howard, also kno'vn as F. P. Howard, deceased. This
Estate is in the custody and subject to the control and
disposition of the Court.
We submit, that in the instant case, the Utah Rule
is peculiarly applicable to Appellants, and their Motion
to Interyene should have been granted as a n1atter of
right, pursuant to such Rule, and that the lower Court
had no discretion to deny such ~.Iotion.
2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, page 1139,

states:
"The conditions prerequisite to the exercise
of the right of intervention, depend largely, of
course, upon the wording of the Statute under
which ~he right is asserted. However, it may be
broadly stated that when the applicant is not an
indispensable party, intervention will not, as a
rule, be allowed, when it will retard the principle
suit, or will require a reopening of the case, or delay the trial, or change the position of the original
parties, or "\Vill change the form of the action or
the issues. But it is to be born in, mind, that it
would be practically in1possible for one to intervene in an action without presenting a question
of fact not involved in the pleadings of the original parties, and if this were inhibited, then the
Code provision on the subject of intervention,
would be of no avail. The question, therefore,
whether or not, a new issue of fact is presented by
a Petition for Intervention, is not the test to apply
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in determining whether an issue, different from
that between the original parties will be made
by the intervenor; it is sufficient that the ultimate
issue to be determined, remains the same."
In the instant case, the ultimate issue to be deterlnined is to whom some or all of the property of ~Irs.
Florence P. Howard, also known as F'. P. Howard, should
be distributed. That 'vas the ultimate. question in the
Contest, as filed, and that is the ultimate issue raised
by the Motion to Intervene.
In the case of Houston Real Estate Investment Con~
pany v. Hechler, 44 U. 64, 138 P. 1159, at page 1162, this
Honorable Court stated:
"As we understand the purpose of the Statute relating to intervention, it is not intended to
be implied only where a third person may have
such an interest in the subject of the action which
makes him an indispensable party; but the Statute
applies where such third person, at some stage of
the proceedings before trial is shown to have an
interest which would make him a proper party."
We submit, in the instant case, that the Appellants
had such an interest as would make them proper parties.
The determination of the Will Contest will, to a large
extent, declare who will receive the bulk of the Estate of
Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased~

In the case of Cache Lapoudre Irrigating Co1npa·ny
v. Hally, 43 Colo. 32, 95 P. 317, the Supreme Court of
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Colorado, in discussing the questions raised by intervention, stated:
Hit would be practically iinpossible for one to
intervene in an action "\Yithout presenting a question of fact not involved in the p~leadings of the
original parties, and if this was inhibited, then our
Code provision on the subject of intervention
would be of no avail. The question of whether or
not a new issue of fact is presented by a petition
of intervention is not the test to apply under a
Code provision as broad as ours, in determining
'vhether an issue different from that between
the original parties will be made by the intervenor. * * * True the intervenor pleaded facts
upon which it predicated a right to the subjectmatter of controversy which are not stated in the
original pleadings, and which, if established,
would prevent the judgment which the plaintiffs
seek, but that has not changed the original issue.
It still remains as it was, i.e., are or are not the
plaintiffs entitled to divert the water from the
stream which they claim~ In other words, although intervenor predicates its right to the subject-matter of controversy upon which it relies for
a judgment in its favor, and to defeat a recovery
in favor of plaintiffs upon facts not stated in
either of the pleadings of the original parties, yet
the ultimate issue to be determined, the right to
divert water from the stream, remains the same,
and this appears to be the general rule by which
to determine whether or not the intervenor has
injected a new issue into the case in which he is
allowed to intervene."
In the instant case, the ultimate question involved,
is to who1n should the property of Florence P. Howard,
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also known as . F. P. Howard, deceased, be distributed.
The Answer and Cross-Complaint of Appellants, raises
the same ultimate question, to~ wit: To whom should the
property of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P.
Howard, deceased, be distributed. No new ultimate issue
need be determined.
McGill University and the Protestant Board of
School Commissioners of Montreal, prayed in their Answers, that all four instruments together constitute the
last Will and Testament of Florence P. Howard, also
known as F. P. Howard, deceased. This, of necessity,
raises the negative, that none of the instruments constitute the last Will and Testament of Florence P.
Howard, also known as F·. P.

How~rd,

deceased, and that

is one of the positions taken by Appellants in their Answer and Cross-Complaint. It is thus obvious, that not
only is the

ultimat~

issue, as raised by the Appellants,

the same, but the fact situation to be determined is identical with that raised by McGill University and the Protestant Board of ·sehool Commissioners, to-wit: Do, or do
not, the four instruments constitute the last Will and
Testament of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P.
Howard, deceased~
The Answer of Mildred Black raises that issue and
the issue of the revocation of the for1ner wills by the ,vill
·dated January 14, 1952.
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POINT NO. III.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION HAD NOT RUN ON INTERVENTION.

In the instant case, a Will Contest was filed in due
time, by Helen Duys, Ernest F. Howard and Ethel Fnrrest, in which they claimed that the first two instruments
were revoked by the instrument dated May 7, 1949, and
that the instrument dated January 14, 1952 was a Codicil
to the 1949 instrument (Record, page 131).
On the sixth day of December, 1952, Mildred Black,
for and on behalf of herself and her brother and sisters,
Hilda Black, Roger Black and Rachel Helps, filed an Answer to said Will Contest; and in said Answer, Mildred
Black claimed that the said instrument of January 14,
1952 was intended by Florence P. Howard, also known
as F. P. Howard, to be her sole will, to the exclusion of
all other documents (Record, page 62).
On the sixteenth day of December, 1952, McGill University and the Protestant Board of School Commissioners of ~Iontreal, each filed Answers in said Will Contest,
wherein each alleged that the four holographic instruments constituted the last Will and Testament of said
decedent (Record, pages 64 and 66).
On January 14, 1953, Appellants herein, filed a Motion to Intervene in said Will Contest and attached to
said Motion their Answ~r and Cross-C.omplaint in Inte-rvention, which alleged that none of the documents was
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the last Will and Testament of Florence P. Howard, also
known as F. P. Howard, deceased, but that if any of then1
were, it was the last document \Yritten and executed and
dated January 14, 19·52, by the said Florence P. I-Io"rard,
also known as F. P. Howard, deceased (Record, page
141). This latter position is identical to the position
taken by Mildred Black, Hilda Black, Roger Black and
Rachel Helps (Record, page 62).
In their Answer and Cross-Co1nplaint in Intervention, Appellap.ts further raised the jurisdictional facts
discussed under Point I, supra, which had not been
raised by any of the otheT parties.
On the nineteenth day of January, 1953, the ~fotion
to Intervene was heard by the said District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, and the Honorable Judge thereof,
on January 19, 1953, orally denied Appellants right to
intervene in said Will Contest, and later, to--wit: On the
fifth day of February, 1953, signed a written Order, denying Appellants' Motion to Intervene (Record, page 196).
The position of the Appellants is that the filing of
the Contest of Wills tolled the six months statute of liinitations, so that it did not apply as to anybody.
1

Ba;n.croft Probate Practice, Second Edition, page

410, states:

"But once the jurisdiction of the Court, to
deter1nine the validity of a will attaches hY the
timely filing of a contest, the court does not lose
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jurisdiction thereon until disposition has been
1nade of the matter, or stating it in another way,
the order admitting the will to probate does not
become final within that period authorized by the
particular state for eontest, if a contes,t is filed."
See Voyce v. Superior Court (Calif.) 127 P.
2d 536;

Pecks' Esta.te, 153 Wash. 687, 280 P. 87.
In any event, Appellants should have been permitted
to intervene to the extent of the issues already raised
in the Will Contest by the Answer of Mildred Black, Hilda
Black, Roger Black and Rachel Helps, to-wit: That the
instrument dated January 14, 1952, constituted the last
Will and Testament of Florence P. Howard, also known
as F. P. Howard, deceased, to the exclusion of the other
instruments.
There are many cases which hold, and it is almost
universally accepted that a Will Contest filed within the
statutory time inures to the benefit of any interested
party intervening after such time, and the Statute of
Limitations is no defense to his petition in intervention.
See Bu.tzow's Estate, (Cal.), 68 P. 2d 374, wheTein
it is stated:
"The question does not appear to have been
decided in this state; and it appears from decisions from other jurisdictions that a contest filed
within the statutory time inures to the benefit
of an interested party to intervene after the statutory period, and that the statute of limitations
is not a defense to such a petition. (Citing cases)~
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In illinoi~, however, the contrary was held. Brainley v. Bromley, Ill., 191 NE 268, 93 ALR 1041.
As between the two lines of decisions, we prefer
to follow that which seems to be the more liberal
rule declared by the Kansas and Ohio courts.''
In Weichold v. Day, (Okla.), 236 P., p·age 649, the
court stated:
"This court has held that, where an action to
set aside a will is properly brought by a bona fide
litigant who is not barred by the Statute of Liinitations from maintaining it, such action inures to
the benefit of all others concerned who intervene
in the action, although they themselves 'vould be
barred by the Statute of Limitations fron1 instituting it." (Citing cases.)
The court cited with approval:
Pow-ell v. Koehler, 52 Ohio 102, 39 NE 195,
26 LR.A 480, 49 Am. State Reports 705 to
the same effect.

Section 75-14·-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
"Any person shall have a right to be heard by
the court at any hearing on any question effecting a probate or guardianship matter in which he
is interested."
On the authority of this ·statute, the Court should
have permitted the Appellants to intervene in said Will
Contest. Certainly, the Appellants should have heen permitted to intervene to the extent of the issues raif'ed by
the pleading of Mildred Black, Hilda Black, R.oger Blaek
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and Rachel Help·s, and McGill University and the Protestant Board of School Commissioners of Montreal,
and \~Valker Bank & Trust Company.
See Maurier v. Miller, 77 Kan. 92, 93 P. 596,
8 ALR 2nd 111.

POINT NO. IV.
APPELLANTS HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IF PERMITTED TO
INTERVENE.

Appellants should have been granted leave to intervene, and after intervention should have been allowed
to introduce evidence and the Court should have heard
evidence conce~ning the surrounding circun1s.tances of
the execution of the wills, exclusive of her oral declarations, and should have granted to Ap·pellants a trial of the
issues before a jury, if asked for.
Section 74-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Appellants not only should have been granted leave
to intervene, but had a more than reasonably fair chance
of having their position sustained on a Will Contest,
namely that·none of the instruments constituted the last
will of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard,
deceased, or if any instrument be her will, it is the instrument dated Jan. 14, 1952. While there is a presumption in some states that the will of a person should be
construed so as to prevent partial intestacy, the Utah
Statute says, that it should be construed so as to prevent
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total intestacy. The blood heirs of the testator n1ay not be
cut off without clear and unequivocal language, (In re
Clark's Estate (Cal.) 149 P. 2d 465, 57 Am. Jur. 757, and
cases cited there). The interpretation propounded by
the Respondents herein, would completely cut off the
blood heirs of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P.
Howard, deceased. In addition, there is a series of cases
which hold that a later will not disposing of the residue,
revokes an earlier will which does dispose of the residue.
See Plenty v. West, 6 C.B: 201, 16 Beg. 173,
51 Eng. Rep. 743;

In re Estate of Bryan, 1907 Prob. 125, 6
B.R.C·. 25;
In re Estate of Fawcett, 1941 Pro b. 86;
I

See also the annotation following Esta.te of
Bryan, at 6 B.R.C. 25;

In re Wupperman's Estate, 300 N. Y. Supp.
344;
In re Bjor's Estate (Cal.) 229 P. 2nd 468.
In 28 ALR 2nd 535, 546, the annotator cites In re
Marx's E.state, 174 C·al. 762, 164 P. 640 (the case cited
below by respondents as contra to appellants position) as
turning on the theory of "dependent relative revocation".
In the instant case no such theory is involved. In 2R
ALR 2nd 554 and 555, there is a discussion of 1nany
cases holding contrary to In re Marx, especially good i~
the discussion of In re Wupperman, 300 N.Y. Supp. 2-t-4,
as is contained on page 552.
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The primary rule for the construction of a will is to
ascertain the testator's intention. In the instant case,
several bequests of specific personal property were
changed from \viii to will.
The manner in \vhich the testatrix changed the objects of her bounty concerning certain bequests, should
have caused the court to have allowed intervention and
testimony, and in view of the cases cited herein, should
have persuaded the court that the inte-nt of Florence P.
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased, was to
make a final will on January 14, 1952, which was so inconsistent with the former instruments, as to result legally in their revocation. Illustrative of this, is the disposition of various personal items :
SILVER TOILET SET:
Given to Marie Petry in instrument ap~pended to
holographic will, dated June 3, 1940.
Given to Miss Mildred Black in instrument dated
May 7~ 1949.
Given to Rosamond Lamb and Mary Stuart Tinling in the instrument dated January 14, 1952, along
with other personal effects, which were not specific
bequests. Marie Petry is given $5,000.00 and some
little thing, in the 1952 instrument, and Miss Mildre'd
Black is given $2,500.00 and a diamond watch in
the same instrument.
SOLITAIRE DIANIOND RING:
Given to Isobel Budden in the instrument dated
June 3, 1940.
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Given to Isobel Budden in the instrument dated
May 7, 1949, and also $3,000.00.
Given to Isobel Budden in the instrument dated
January 14, 1952.
OL·D SILVER TEAPOT:
Given to Ernest F. Howard in the instrmnent dated
June 3, 1940. He is also given a portion of the residue.
Given to Ernest F. Howard, (address from ~Irs. H.
M. Duys, ~1ontclaire) in the instrmnent dated ]_\Jfay
7, 19·49.
Given to R-osamond Lamb and Mary Stuart Tinling
in the instrument dated January 14, 1952, along
with other personal effects, which were not specific
bequests, and Ernest F. Howard was given a portrait of his grandfather.
DIAMOND AND EMERALD RING:
Given to Mrs. H. I-I. Lamb, ("or if she predecease
n1e to her daughter, Rosamond") in the instrun1ent
dated June 3, 1940, and also $1,000.00.
Given to Rosan1ond Lamb in the instrument dated
May 7, 1949, and also $2,000.00.
Given to Rosamond Lamb in the instrun1ent dated
January 14, 1~52, together with $50,000.00 and onehalf of balanee of personal effects.
DIAMOND WIDE BROOCH:
Given to Mrs. C. P. Howard, in the 1940 instrmnent,
and described as being a circular dia1nond brooch.
In the instrument dated F·ebruary 6, l 939, onP Cavie
I>. I-Ioward or his heirs, are given $2,000.00.
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Given to Mrs. William Stewart in the instruments
dated January 14, 1952, and May 7,1949.
DIAMOND WATCH:
Given to Gertrude (Petry) Lewis in the instrument
dated June 3, 1940, and called a diamond and platinum watch. In 1939, Mrs. Gertrude (Petry) Lewis
is given 3j20ths of the remainder of the estate.
Given to Mrs. Percy E. Radley in the instrument
dated May 7, 1949.
Given to Mildred Black in the instrument dated January 14, 1952.
It will be noted that in the 1940 instrument, Mrs.
Helen i\I. Duys is given a box of pictures and a large
native rare basket in case, which were stored at Hagers
Warehouse, and in the 19·39 instrument, a Mrs. Helen
Howard Duys is given 3j20ths of the remainder of the. estate, and in 1949, she is given the old silver tea caddy. In
1952, Mrs. Henry M. Duys is given the solitaire diamond
pendant. And note the language of the 1952 instrument,
where all of the personal effects go to Rosamond Lamb
and Mary Stuart Tinling, subject to certain special bequests.
In Sa,nford v. Vaughan1 1 Phillip Eccl. Rep. 39, 161
Eng. Reprint 907, the court held that this denoted an intention to substitute one will for the other, and held that
by bequeathing the specific personal property differently
in the second will, the testator had in effect, substituted
the second will for the first and had impliedly revoked
the first.
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In the case of D-empsey v. Lawson, LR,. 2 Prob. Di\.
98, the court held that a second will, repeating various
bequeaths in the first will, and appointing the same executor as in that document, revoked the first "rill, though
it contained no residuary clause.
In the instant ease, it was stipulated that ~Irs. Florence P. Howard, also known as Mrs. F. P. Howard, had
the three former instruments with her at the time she
wrote the fourth instrument, and in the case of Shiel v.
0' Brien, IR. Rep. 7 Eq. 64, the Court held that if a person
with an earlier will before him, executed a second "Till,
complete in form, the intention of the testa tor was obviously to revoke the first.
It will be noted by an examination of the original
instruments, (not the photostats), that the testatrix
knew the difference between a codicil and a will, since she
had written on the top of one page, "Codicil", although
she had not written anything n1ore than that. She had
also written at the top of the instrument dated June 3,

1940, "appended to holographic will", and had used the
phrase, "this is the last will of me, Florence P. Howard"
in the will of January 14, 1952, as well as in a previous
instrument, so that the instrument of January 14-, 1952
is not a codicil and was not in tended to be such. It "Till
be noted also, at the top of the page of that will, testatrix
used the term "holographic will" and underlined the sante
words.
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In the case of In re Drake, 15 N.J. Misc. R. 44, 192
.A... 428, the court held that the second will revoked the
first, although the result was a partial intestacy, and
stated:
'"The t\vo wills are inconsistent because in the
first will he disposed of all his property by will
and made provisions for the contingency of his
wife's pre-decease, while in the second will he did
not provide for such contingency, but left the disposition in such case to the provisions of the laws
of intestacy in force at his decease and the circumstances existing at that time. The result is not
necessarily the 'Same and is not the same in this
case, and in any case the two modes of disposition are legally different and p·ass a different
estate."
In the instrument of January 14, 1952, a bequest
is 1nade to one Marie Petry of Port Hope, Ontario, and to
Mrs. Peter Lewis of the same place, and a bequest is
rnade to Mrs. Henry ~I. Duys and to Ernest Howard, the
brother of Mrs. Henry M. Duys. In the instrument of
May 7, 1949, a statement is made, "balance of estate after
bequests, expenses have been paid to he divided as follows:" Thereafter, a certain percentage is given to Mrs.
Helen Howard Duys, Ernest F'. Howard, Marie Petry
and Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis. It is importap.t to know
whether or not the Marie Petry mentioned in the instruJnent of January 14, 1952 is the same as the ~1arie Petry
.1nentioned in the 1949 instrument, and whether or not
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strument is the same as Mrs. Gertrude Petry Le,vis Inentioned in the 1949 instrument, and whether Mrs. Henry
M. Duys is the same person as Mrs. Helen Howard Duys
mentioned in the 1949 instrument, and whether Ernest
Howard, mentioned in the January 14, 1952 instrun1ent,
is the same person as Ernest F. Howard mentioned in the
1949 instrument. If evidence had been allowed to be introduced-, and the intervenors allowed in the case, this
matter could have been developed, and if they were found
to be the same persons, it would have great bearing on
the intention of the testatrix in the January 14, 1952
will, in this : That she did take care of those 'vhom she
desired who were residuary legatees under the 1949 'Yill,
and it clearly shows an intention to revoke the bequests
giving certain property in the 1949 instrument, especially if we consider the language in the will, "balance
of the estate after bequests, expenses have been paid to
be divided as follows:" with the language in the 19[)2
instrument, "if after taxes and estate expenses are paid,
there is. a surplus of over $50,000.00; I wish the above
cash (tax free) bequests to be doubled - including $50,000.00 to Rosamond Lamb, Montreal."
In the 1952 will, Marie Petry is g1ven $5,000.00,
which is to be doubled, if after taxes and estate expenses
are paid, there is a surplus of over $50,000.00. In the
san1e manner, Mrs. Peter Lewis is to get $3,000.00 to he
doubled in the same manner. In the 1939 'vill, the balanee
of the estate is to be divided as follows: 7j20ths to ::\1 rs.
H. J. H. Petry, and should she predecease the tPstatrix,
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the above 7j20ths to be divided as follows: 4j20ths to
Marie Petry and 3j20ths to Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis;
4j20ths to Thirs. Helen Duys, and 3j20ths to Ernest Howard, and evidence should have been adduced as to whether
or not Thirs. H. J. H. Petry predeceased Mrs. Florence
P. Howard, also knovvn as F. P. Howard. In the 1949
will, the balance of the estate, after bequests and expenses
have been paid, is to be divided as follows: 3j20ths to
Mrs. Helen Howard Duys, 3j20ths to Ernest F. Howard,
3j20ths to Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis and 3j20ths to
Marie Petry. The change in the dispositive provisions
for these persons appeared not only in the 1952 will, but
there is a change between the 1939 and the 1949 instruments. In the 1939 instrument, Marie Petry was to get
4j20ths of the 7j20ths, and Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis
was to get 3j20ths of the 7j20ths. And in the 1949 will,
Marie Petry was to get 3j20ths instead of 4j20ths. In
the 1952 will she was to get $5,000.00 which is to be
doubled under certain circumstances. If Mrs. Florence
P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, did not intend
by her vvill of 1952 t6 revoke the previous dispositive
provisions in favor of Marie Petry and Mrs. Peter
Lewis, who it appears may be the same person as Mrs.
Gertrude Petry Lewis, she would not have asked that the
bequests in their favor be doubled if there was a certain
surplus. In other words, the doubling of the bequests in
the 1952 will was intended to take care of the contingency
of there being a surplus after the specific bequests,
expenses of administration and taxes, rather than to
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have the surplus distributed under the residuary provisions of the 1949 will. To disregard this arrangen1ent
would be to fly in the face of precedent and would result
in the court writing a will for the testatrix contrary to
her expressed intention. It would require a court to
hold that although the testatrix, in the will of 1952, had
especially provided for Marie Petry and Mrs. Gertrude
Petry Lewis and Mrs. Henry M. Duys and Ernest
Howard, and did not provide for the other residuary
legatees mentioned in the 1939 or the 1949 wills, to-wit:
Mrs. Gordon Burleigh and Mrs. Ethel Forrest and Ilenry
Howard Petry, she did not so intend. It may be noted
that thyre are seven persons na1ned as those to take the
balance of the estate in the 1949 will, and six to take the
balance in the 1939 will, if Mrs. H. J. H. Petry predeceased the testatrix. One of the differences between
the names of those to get the balance of the estate,
between the 1939 and the 1949 will is Henry Howard
Petry, who may or may not be the husband or son of
Mrs. H. J. H. Petry. In any event, this points out
further the· fact that the Motion to Intervene should
have been granted and evidence taken on the contest.
To give a construction that would require the holding
that these dispositive provisions in the 1952 instru1nent
are not so inconsistent with the 1949 and 1939 instruments as to show an intention on the part of the testatrix
to revoke the previous instruments, would result in a
disregard of the testatrix's intention to revoke the provisions as to the balance of the residuary legatees in the
1949 will.
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It 'viii be noted that Section 74-1-22, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides that a prior will is revoked
by a subsequent will w·here the "later C'Ontains an express
revocation or provisions wholly inconsistent with the
terms of the former will * * *." This statute does not
say that all of the provisions must be wholly inconsistent,
or that the will must be wholly inconsistent, but that the
later will contained "provisions" wholly inconsistent.
It will be noted that the Executor in this ca:se, the
Walker Bank & Trust Company, objected to the Motion
of Appellants to intervene, although it was app·arent
from the record that no notice of the hearing of 1\llay
14, 1952, for the admission to probate of the instruments,
was given either by mailing to the Appellants., or by
publication or lawful posting.
In view of Tiller, et al., vs. Norton, et al., a Utah
case, decided February 20, 1953, found at 253 P. 2d 618,
not yet reported in the Utah Reports, wherein the Trust
Co1npany went to great effort to ascertain the heirs in
above entitled _case, the executor here should have welcomed any action which would have determined the heirs
and legatees. The Court stated in the case of Tiller vs.
Norton:
"Under the facts and the authorities, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding
there was no such fraud, although we are constrained to believe and to note that the probate
well might have been deferred by the court a little
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longer in this case in the hope that what happened
would happen, * * * the appearance of the children, who became the unwilling victims of a
damnum absque injuria."
And in the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe,
reference is made to the case of Parker vs. Ross, (Utah);
217 P. 2d 373.
In the instant case, the executor, upon being apprised
that there were heirs and that there was a question as
to the disposition of the property, objects to the intervention of such heirs and the taking of testimony roncerning the dispositive provisions of the instrun1ents.
In the case of McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 16!) A.
24, an unattested will, informally drawn, was held to
revoke a prior will, even though the unattested later 'vill
was ineffective as to the charitable residuary bequest
constituting its chief disposition. The court said:
"Testatrix, in her second will, after providing
for funeral expenses and the care of her lot,
directs all her property to be reduced to cash,
and gives it all to the 11 on1e for Protestant Children. That is what she intended to do, and by so
doing she completely annulled her pre-existing
intention to give six bonds to the League of
Women Voters. She disposes of 'everything else
belonging to' her. There could be no clearer
expression of intent than this provision. The mer,:~
fact that the 'vill did not earry \vith it a sufficient
execution to 1nake the gift complete does not
destroy the thought in the testatrix's n1ind \vhen
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she wrote that paragraph, nor can we say that
her intention was not complete because the will
lacked t'vo signatures."

An interesting discussion is found in 15 Iowa Law
Review 232.
In discussing Kearns vs. Roush, 146 S.E. 729 (W.
\:a. 1929), the revie'v says :
The expression is often used that a subsequent will only revokes the former insofar as the
t\vo are so inconsistent that they cannot stand
together. 1 Williams, Executors (7th Am. Ed.)
212. As a general rule, this may he true; but the
statement is frequently made where there is no
necessity for language of such a sweeping nature.
In re Venables Will, 127 N.C. 344, 37 S.E. 465
(1900), Williams vs. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W.
705 (1903), Sampson vs. Foxon (1907) Prob. 34.
There is a noticeable tendency of the courts to
harmonize, if at all possible, the conflicting instruments. Foy vs. F'oy, 125 Iowa 424, 101 N.W. 144
(1904). This is prompted by an abhorrence of a
partial intestacy. Great inconvenience is occasioned when a portion of the property p~asses by
the laws of testate succession and the remainder
by the distinctly different laws .of intestacy. In
re Marx Estate, 174 Cal. 762, 164 ·P. 640 (1917),
Goods of Hartley, 50 L.J.P.D. 1 (1880). Perhaps
too great an e1nphasis is placed upon the presumption against p·artial intestacy which orig~
inated at an early period when religious custom
was a forceful inducement to make a will, but
today no ·such reason exists. With the adequate
provision for the disposition of intestate property
at the present time it might well seem that since
4

"
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the reason for the presumption no longer exists,
it should be abolished. More consideration should
be given to the true intention of the testator, by
this, we mean his desire with respect to the
apportionment of the property, rather than to the
forn1 of the will or the n1echanics of disposition
Dempsey vs. Lawson, 2 P.D. 98 (1877). If the
intention of the testator is to be given paramount
consideration it might logically follow that, "~hen
the terms of the subsequent will clearly sho\\· a
desire to depart fro1n the terms of the forn1e1
doclunent, the first will should be revoked in its
entirety despite the fact that a partial intestac)
might result. Plenty vs. West, 9 Jur. 458 (1845))
Dempsey vs. Lawson, supra. If the general rule
that the first will is revoked by the second onl~
insofar as it is inconsistent, "·ere strictly follo\ved
it would seem that· where no executor \vas ap·
pointed by the latter will, the executor nan1ed in
the first should be carried over, but that was not
the result. To justify this departure fro1n logic
two solutions may be advanced. The first requires
a distinction between the executor and the bene·
ficiary and treats the former as an exception to
the rule and is. in a category by himself. l\Ians
courts have recognized the difference between
executor and beneficiary, but have dismissed the
matter in a perfunctory 1nanner without atten1pt.
ing to establish a legal distinction. In re Gen·
sinore's Est., 246 Pa. 216, 92 Atl. 134 (1914), in
re Iburg's Estate, 196 Colo. 333, 238 Pae. 74
(1925). The differences are readily apparent.
The interest of the executor is earned while thai
of the beneficiary is in the nature of a gift. The
executor is an officer of the court \Vhich further
distinguishes hiin fron1 the beneficiary. .At an
early stage of the la\\'" the appoinbnent of an
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executor is not required. Even though these are
1narked differences, it n1ay be questioned if they
\Yould ""'arrant the application of distinctly different rules. The other view is of a more liberal
nature, and would disregard the distinction bet,veen executor and beneficiary. If this stand is
taken the principal case might be considered as
an extension of the doctrine of revocation by
implication."
It \vill be noted, that of the seven residuary legatees
n1entioned in the 1949 docm11ent, several of them have
specific bequests in the 1952 document and several others,
under slightly different na1nes have also such specific
bequests, for example: The 1949 will makes Marie Petry
a residuary legatee, and· the 1952 will makes a specific
bequest to Marie Petry. The 1949 will makes Ern·est
Howard one of the residuary legatees and the 1952 will Inakes a specific bequest to Ernest Howard. The 1949
will makes Mrs. Helen Howard Duys a residuary legatee,
and the 1952 will makes a specific bequest to Mrs. Henry
M. Duys. The 1949 will makes Mrs.. Gertrude Petry
Lewis one of the residuary legatee_s and the 1952 will
makes a specific bequest to Mrs. Peter Lewis of the same
address. If these latter four people, are not the same two
under different names, the 1952 will has specifically taken
care of four of her residuary legatees., and such fact is
confir1natory of her intent that the 1952 will he her sole
existing testament at the time of her death. The lower
Court should at least have taken evidence to establish
whether these people are the same or are four different
people.
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POINT NO. V.
SINCE THE PROPOSED INTERVENORS WERE DENIED INTERVENTION, THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
MADE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT AS
THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN GRANTED A TRIAL AND
WERE PARTIES, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO BIND THEM BY SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE, AS SIGNED IN THE
PURPORTED WILL CONTEST.

It will be noted that after the Inter1nediate Appeal
had been granted by this Honorable Court, one of the
Attorneys for Respondents, prepared and had signed by
the Court, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La"r
and Decree, atte1npting to bind Appellants in the purported Will Contest.
In 1 Freeman on Judgntents, page 899, it states:
"Thus one who merely enters an appearance
for the purpose of intervention, but withdra\v~
before filing a petition, does not become a party,
so as to be hound by the subsequent judgment,
and the same is true of one whose petition has
been dismissed, or whose attempt to intervene
is defeated by the adverse party, or whose claim
has been withdrawn before judgment."
It will be noted that Appellants' atteu1pt to intervene was defeated by the adverse parties, anrl Appellants
not only should not be bound, but no reference should
be made to them in the Findings and Conclusions and
particularly in the introductor~r part, where it statP~
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that the . A. ppellants vvere present and appeared by counsel, which is not legally true, as is shown by the Court's
Order, denying-leave to intervene.
30 .LJm. Jttr., page 951, Section 220 states:
Strangers to Judgment.-"It is well settled
that, with certain exceptions hereinafter noted,
the doctrine res judicata does not operate to affect
strangers to a judgment, that is, to affect the
rights of those who are neither parties nor in
privity with a party therein. The judgment is
not available as an adjudication either against
or in favor of such other persons, whether it is
attempted to be used in connection with the cause
of action previously litigated, or in connection
with particular issues determined therein. A
party to the principal. case is regarded as a
stranger to the judgment rendered in the previous
action where he was not directly interested in
the subject matter thereof, and had no right to
make defense, adduce testimony, cross-examine
witnesses, control the proceedings, or appeal from
the judgment, even though he could have made
himself a party to the previous action. The right
to intervene in an action does not, in the absence
of its exercise, subject one possessing it to the
risk of being hound by the result of the litigation,
under the doctrine of res judicata."
31 Ant. Jur., page 74, Section 411, state-s:
Opportunity to he heard.-"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party to be
affected by a personal judgment must have a day
in court, or an opp-ortunity to be heard. In this
connection, it is sometimes declared broadly that
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every man is entitled to an opportunity to be
heard in a court of laV\r upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. The
judgment of a court without hearing the party
or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not
a judicial determination of his rights, and is not
entitled to respect in any other tribunal."
It will be observed that in the instant case, Appellants atten1pted to intervene, but were denied the right,
and are in at least as good a position as a person "·ho
had the right to intervene but did not exercise it.
We further submit, no attempt should be made to
bind the Appellants without granting then1 their "day
in court" and to permit theln to introduce testiinony
in support of their position.
In the case of Rogers vs. Trans American Corpora-

tion (Calif.), 44 P. 2d 635; it was stated:
"When a party is dismissed fro1n an action
he becomes a stranger thereto, and no judg1nent
or order can be rendered against hun therein until
the dismissal is vacated.''
To paraphrase the above words slightly, and to carry
the theory over, we would like to sub1nit the true rule

i~:

When a party attempts to intervene in an
action and h·e is denied such right, he re1nains
a stranger thereto, and no judginent or order
can be rendered against hin1 therein, until the
denial of intervention is vaeated.
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It is submitted that pending determination of this
Intermediate Appeal, an Order of the s,upreme Court
should issue directing the lower Court to withdraw an.d
rescind its said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted :
That the Order admitting the wills to p.robate was
not a valid order, because the Court had no jurisdiction
of the matter, and therefore, the six-months time for
filing a Contest, provided by statute, could not commence
to run until there was a valid order.
That the Motion to Intervene should have been
granted.
That since the Court did not allow the Ap~p,ellants
to intervene, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decree in the matter of the Contest, should
be set aside as not binding upon the Ap·pellants.
That the Court order that the costs of Appellants on
this appeal be paid out of the assets. of the estate. Sec.
75-14-21, U.C.A. 1953.
R·espectfully submitted,
H. F. LAZIER of LAZIER & LAZIER,
JOHN D. RICE, JAMES E. FAUST, J.
LAMBERT GIBSON, and CLEON B.
F·EIGHT,
Attorneys for Petitioners in Intervention and A.ppellwnts.
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